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State Bureaucracy and Black Labour in South Africa: the
Milling Workers' Strike of 1944.
David Duncan
i) Introduct ion.
In September 1944, African milling workers on the Rand, in Pretoria
and in several other centres in the Transvaal, went on strike. The
stoppage lasted only a few days, but it involved over 1200 hundred
labourers) mare than half of whom mere arrested. The strike was
supported by the Council for Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU), the
Trades and Labour Council (TLC), the Communist Party, the Campaign
for Right and Justice (CRJ), and various religious
denominations.(1) It attracted the attention of politicians at the
highest level, and disrupted supplies of a basic commodity to the
general public. The ending of the stoppage was confused, with
compromises on both sides and appeals to official arbitration.
Within four months, though, the workers were receiving a few
shillings more each week in their pay packets.
This study focuses on the role of the State bureaucracy before and
during the milling dispute. The Department of Labour was chiefly
involved in the run up to the strike? and in its settlement. During
the actual stoppage, the Native Affairs Department (NAD) was much
to the fore, with subsidiary parts for the South African Police,
the Justice? Department, and the Prime Minister's office. All five-;
had also been involved in the coal distributors' strike three
months earlier, which helped to shape the tactics adopted by
officials during the milling dispute.
South African historiography has neglected the State and its
internal divisions and contradictions, especially in the context of
its relations with labour. The main works which have broached the
topic-- such as Yudelman's "The Emergence of Modern South Africa",
Davies's "Capital, state and white labour", and Johnstone's; "Class;,
Race and Gold"-- have? tended to treat the State in an overly unified
manner, seeing it either as an instrument of capital (or fractions
thereof), or as possessing interests of its own which are
subscribed to by all its constituent parts. (2) In particular, the
position of the bureaucracy has been ignored. Little; attempt has
been made to plot the divisions which existed between different
branches of the civil service, or to explain the role of the
bureaucracy in formulating and implementing the policies of
successive governments.
This is all the more remarkable given the recognition of the
bureaucracy as an important factor in the literature on social
theory. Max Weber regarded the development of bureaucratised state
apparatus;, with its pyramidal hierarchy of authority and salaried,
full-time staff, as a condition for the spread of capitalism.(3)
For him, the formation of a formal, codified law, and its
administration by the bureaucracy, promoted the centralisation of
power in the hands; of a minority. In the context of South African
labour history, this is certainly true of thus period 1910-1943.
From the Native-? Labour Regulation Act of 1911 to the Native? Laws
Commission of 1946-8, the State elaborated its; powers of control
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over African workers; it also created and expanded the civil
service-? needed to implement the legislation and to stabilise and
regularise the rapidly growing set of laws.(4)
More recently, the English sociologist, Anthony Giddens, has
criticised Weber's pessimistic view of bureaucratic organisation.
He sees a constant process; of "active struggle, in which those in
subordinate positions are by no means always the losers".(5) Again,
aspects of Giddens' theories are evident in the course of this
strike, even though the strikers had no formal rights in the
political structure. Those in subordinate positions refused to be
mere 'passive recipients' of bureaucratic domination, and instead,
generated a minor degree of change through the collective
withdrawal of labour.
Theoretical literature from the field of public administration also
sheds some light on the bureaucracy's role in this dispute. The
discipline originated in the USA around 1900, and was only slowly
accepted in South Africa by academics and administrators.(6) By the
1930s, however, the Government, the bureaucracy and employers had
all been imbued with the principles of scientific management. For
the labour market, this encouraged a drive towards the more
efficient 'use' of different categories of labour and their
regulation by rationalised systems of control.<7) For the civil
service itself, the "scientific management approach" placed a
premium on highly-trained specialists, with clearly defined
functions within the bureaucracy.(B) Both of these features are to
be seen at work during the milling workers' strike: the stoppage
was partly caused by the over-specialisation of the Labour and
Native Affairs Departments; and yet the responses of officials were
dictated partly by their outrage at the violation of their
technical procedures for controlling labour relations.
Within the State, the bureaucracy played a crucial role in dealing
with the strike. Although Cabinet Ministers carried the ultimate
responsibi1ty for their departments, and despite the Prime
Minister's personal interest, it was left up to senior civil
servants to carry out the routine functions* of the>ir departments.
Moreover, in the NAD, the rapid turnover of ministers and the
personal contact between the Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA),
Douglas Smit, and General Smutst gave the officials extra influence
in determining the State's strategy in the strike. The Minister of
Labour, Walter Made ley, had even less of a guiding hand over his
department's officials? decisions were taken at the Divisional
Inspector level, with only the most important ones; being referred
to the Secretary for Labour, Ivan Walker. Rarely, in any
department, was a policy finalised without the advice of senior
civi 3. servants.
ii) The coal distributors' strike.
Two months before the milling strike, the Native Commissioner for
Johannesburg, JM Brink, contacted the SNA about an article in "The
Guardian" on a recent labour dispute.(9) He reminded him of their
recent dinner with the Minister of Native Affairs, at which Brink
and the Director of Native; Labour (DNL) had stressed the need for
"firm action" against African strikers. "It would be disastrous",
he wrote, "if the wrong impression... gained ground; but we can
only counteract it by all concerned acting together firmly in
connection with future strikes and not departing from any decisions
when once made".(10)
The article in question referred to the coal distributors' strike
of June 1944. The outcome of that dispute had an important effect-
on the policies of the Police and the Departments of Native
Affairs, Labour and Justice during the milling workers' strike
three months later.(11) A brief outline of that conflict is
therefore necessary in this context.
Labour problems first hit the coal distributing business in 1941,
when the strike was connected with the Council for Non-European
Trade Unions' demands for official recognition. On that occasion,
370 strikers were arrested, and replacement workers taken on.(12)
Wages and conditions were fixed in a Wage Board Determination which
came into operation on 18 May, 1942.(13) It was this settlement
which the African Commercial and Distributive Workers Union (ACDWU)
desired to have-? altered when they wrote to coal merchants on the
Reef in May 1944. At that time, labourers were paid 26s per- week
plus a ls/2d dirt allowance? the union demanded a minimum L..3 p.w.
plus a 44 hour week, time-and-a-half for overtime, and full pay far
three? weeks annual leave and public: holidays. Evidently, this was
merely an initial bargaining position, probably intended to
highlight the real needs of urban-dwelling Africans.(14) In the
event, the coal merchants refused to negotiate. The strike? began on
5 June before any contact had been made between the employers or
the government departments and the union.
In a pattern which was to be? repeated in the milling dispute, the
Department of Labour failed to anticipate the stoppage. The
Divisional Inspector of Labour also neglected to inform the DNL.'s
office that the strike was underway.(15) More significantly, the
Minister of Labour, Walter Madeley, only appointed an arbitrator
after the dispute was shown to be a serious threat, and even then
he? excluded mule drivers and farriers;, who were mentioned in the
original demands.(16) The lack of coordination clearly irritated
the DNL, who was responsible for the NAD officers who went to
a d dress t h e? s t r i k e r s.
At the local level, though, the NAD's Inspectors of Native-? Labour
(INL) and Native? Commissioners ( N O , and the Department of Labour's
Inspectors combined quite effectively to deal with separate groups
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of labourers. In Brakpan, labourers in three coal companies struck
work. Du Frees of the Department of Labour and the Benoni NC
visited them together to warn them that their actions were illegal.
The Labour Department official promised to investigate certain
specific grievances himselfj and informed them that the question of
wages; would have to be referred to higher authority. About eighty™
s;even strikers promised to return to work the same afternoon. At
Boksburg and Springs, the workers told government officials that
they had come out at the instigation of union representatives; the
Police later took sworn statements for use in incitement
charges.(17)
Only in Randfontein did the normal cooperation between the two
departments break clown. Here, strikers rejected the Inspector of
Native Labour's plea to return to work. The INL asked the Police to
arrest them, but the Police, under instructions from their
Divisional Commander, refused to become involved at this; stage. (IB)
The DNL later warned the Inspector that NAD officials should not
look to the Police for large scale arrests, and should work in
d o s e contact with his office and with the Labour Department.(19)
However, at the centre of the strike in Johannesburg, the? DNL
himself, CP Alport, decided that a mass arrest was his only
possible resort. One thousand workers struck at Newtown on 5 June,
several hundred of whom gathered outside the works*. A Department of
Labour Inspector addressed them, warning that the stoppage was
illegal under emergency wartime regulations, and that they should
submit their complaints; to his department for investigation. (20)
The strikers were apparently unwilling to take any action in the
absence of their Secretary, Daniel Kciza. The-? Labour Department once
again failed to pass on important news to the DNL, in this case
that Kosa was trying to get in touch with him by telephone. The
official who had spoken to the strikers wanted the Police to arrest
them all on the spot in strict accordance with the law. The Public
Prosecutor vetoed this, and instead had the two union leaders,
Abner Mtau and Daniel Koza, detained in the hope that with the
'agitators' out of the way? the rest would return quietly to
work.(21)
The Police were? surprised to find some seven hundred strikers; on
their doorste?p at headquarters the next morning. They demanded the
immediate releas;e of Koza and Mtau, or their own arres;t. At this
point, Alport spoke to the gathering, promising to name the day
when they could meet Labour Department officials concerning their
grievances. He was appalled to find them adamant in their demand
for Koza's release, and duly stood by while the Police arrested 722
strikers. Despite this impressive show of solidarity (the women
workers appeared "disappointed" that they would not be detained
too), and despite the? fact that the union leaders; were already in
gaol, the only explanation Alport could think of was that they had
been "led astray by the Union Officials".(22)
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The? Departments of Labour and Native Affairs; had thus; pe?rmitted a
highly unsatisfactory situation to develop. They had been unaware:
of the prospects of a strike until it had actually begun, and had
made no attempt to prevent it. Their subsequent efforts to bypass
the union leaders and negotiate direct with the workers; ended in
the Magistrate's cells; being burdened with hundreds of mouths to
feed, and the employers being deprived Df their labour force at a
time of shortage. White househol ders;, too, were upset, with much
panic-buying of coal in anticipation of a long strike.(23) The bulk
of the blame for this belonged to the Department of Labour. As; we
shall see in the milling dispute, that department's lack of
sensitivity to the needs of black workers in industry tended to
hamper official efforts to reach an early settlement. The
Government's policy was; to grant ' de facto' recognition to African
unions by allowing them to make representations under the Wage and
Industrial Conciliation Acts as well as the wartime arbitration
machinery; but in practice, the Labour Department had little
dealings; with these unions. (24) Consequently, when a crisis; arose*
the Eitate was; unable to provide the sort of forum which might have
brought about an immediate settlement between the workers and their
employers.
The rest of the action in the coal distributors;' strike revolved
around the Wage Board and the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court. The
Wage Board Chairman, JH Botha, was appointed as arbitrator, and
held hearings at the end of June.(25) A police spy was sent to
attend the ACDWU meeting which selected representatives for the
arbitration proceedings, though in the end Koza was allowed to
speak on the workers' behalf. The Chairman criticised the employers
for not negotiating with the African union. He dismissed their
claims that the ACDWU had been discourteous;, arguing that since the
Dept. of Labour dealt with black unions;, the employers should do so
too. Koza and Senator Easner (one of the representatives of
Africans in Parliament and an attorney in the case against the
strikers) toned down the union's original demands to LI.15 p.w.
plus a 44 hour week; the employers held out for no increase: at all,
with wages remaining at 26s; p.w. plus; a ls/2d dirt allowance. The
final settlement was; closer to the union's figure, at LI. 12=6 for
adult labourers, and LI.15.0 for security guards.(26)
In the Judicial arena, there were, in effect, two cases;- that of
Koza and Mtau for incitement, and the: charge against the strikers;
for stopping work illegally. Both charges were ultimately
withdrawn. As the case against the strikers dragged on with
repeated postponements, the defence lawyers protested the los;s of
pay for each court appearance) the coal merchants complained about
the los;s of labour; and the court officials; grew anxious; about the
cost of the whole? thing. (27) Charges were dropped without reason on
27 June.(28) The case against Koza was closed when he agreed to
address striking milling workers in September.(29)
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"The Guardian" regarded the coal distributors'1 strike as a clear
victory for the workers. Hundreds of labourers had been prepared to
go to gaol unless their union leaders were released; thirty lawyers
had offered their services to defend them; and the; Prosecution had
accepted that it could not implement the War Measure which made
strikes by pass-bearing Africans illegal. "The Guardian" hoped that
the Government would not try to implement this "iniquitous law" in
the future.(30)
It was this leader which prompted the Johannesburg Native
Commissioner to call for greater cooperation and a less
compromising stance within the bureaucracy against further African
strike action. His department did indeed learn some lessons from
the dispute which it applied during the milling workers' strike.
The NAD made a greater attempt to keep in contact with the
Transvaal African Milling Workers Union (TAMWU) and CNETU than it
had with the ACDWU. The-; Native Affairs and Labour Departments also
looked to the Police for immediate coercive action to give effect-
to the Eitate's extensive powers of repression. In general, the two
departments coordinated their actions and pooled information to
eliminate some of the problems which arose during the coal dispute.
On the other hand, the Department of Labour remained inflexible in
its dealings with African workers. Both departments placed undue
trust in mass arrests, ignoring the failure of this tactic in the
coal dispute. And worst of all from the point of view of the
bureaucracy, they over-estimated the degree of cooperation which
they could expect from employers. When the coal strike was; settled,
the merchants agreed to take back the workers without any
victimisation. At least two employers reneged on their word when
they saw the court case running on interminably; in order to serve
the short term interests of their businesses, they threatened to
break the settlement by discharging the former strikers and re-
engaging the replacements. This conflicted with the aims of the
state bureaucracy, which intended to protect the long term
interests of capital, in this instance by securing a peaceful
return to work through a negotiated settlement. Essentially the
same problem of short term versus long term interests was; to arise
in the milling workers' strike, though this time in rather a
d i f ferent form.
iii) The run up to the milling workers' strike.
At one level, the milling industry dispute was caused by the
appallingly low wages and poor conditions endured by the workers.
Yet the conflict would never have erupted if the various government
departments involved had been less preoccupied with internal
administrative procedures, and with their own well-being and
prestige in the public eye. The positions adopted by the
departments within the State varied considerably, and affected the
course of the strike at every stage.
The development of the State's regulation and control of black
workers since 1910 had left the work divided primarily between the
Native Affairs and the Labour Departments. The NAD traditionally
administered all walks of African life; this was doubly so in
districts proclaimed under the Native Labour Regulation Act of
1911. In these 'labour areas', the Government Native Labour Bureau
(GNLB) controlled passes, recruiting, and the conditions of
employment of African workers.(31) Local Native Commissioners
within labour districts were responsible to the? Director of Native
Labour for all functions relating to labour, as were the GNLB'5 own
local Inspectors of Native Labour.
The INL's duties sometimes overlapped with those of the? Department
of Labour, which was responsible for the Industrial Conciliation
and Wage Acts, and whose Inspectors enforced the Factories Act
(concerning conditions on the shop floor).(32) Founded in 1924,
this department was concerned initially only with white workers;
but as more blacks sought employment within the industrial economy
in the 1930s, it became necessary to incorporate them within the
forms of regulation created for whites.
Two features of its history played significant parts in the
Department of Labour's handling of the milling workers' strike. The
first of these was its officials' obvious; preference for dealing
with white workers and their representatives. The department's
Ministers and some of its top civil servantsi including the then
Secretary for Labour, Ivan Walker, were themselves former trade
unionists who had thrown in their lot with the State during the
period of the Pact Government. Their attitude towards white trade?
unions, as shown in their relations with the National Milling
Workers Industrial Union (NMWIU) in this dispute, remained
paternalistic; their treatment of the nascent African unions was at
best off-hand and on occasion openly hostile.(33)
The second notable feature of the Labour Department's development
was the proliferation of ways in which its officers could mediate
or arbitrate in labour disputes. (34) The Industrial! Conciliation
Act of 1924 provided for industrial councils and conciliation
boards of registered unions and employers' associations. If this
failed to produce harmony, a board's members could select an
arbitrator to settle their differences. And if one or other of the?
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parties could not afford the services of an arbitrator (as happened
in this case), the Minister of Labour was empowered to appoint a
civil servant to do the job. Further forms of arbitration supported
by increasing degrees of coercion were established under the Wage
Act of 1925 (plus amendments), and War Measures 9 and 145 of
1942.(35) These laws were? introduced by successive governments to
deal with new situations? and were not always fully understood by
the Department of Labour itself, let alone? by the union organisers.
This was especially cle?ar in the milling workers' dispute, where
the settlement machinery operated by the Department of Labour often
created mare problems than it solved.
The NAD and the Labour Department maintained a common commitment to
preventing the? disruption of a key industry at a time when South
Africa was still heavily involved in the war in Europe. This
apparent unity, which was shared by the Coalition Government and
the wartime bureaucracy, was strengthened by the direct
intervention of the Prime Minister himself. (36) However, it would
be wrong to conclude that this was the sole or, on occasion, even
the main priority for the NAD, which on some issues differed
significantly from the Department of Labour.
In every sphere of its activities, the NAD was hampered by having
to deal with a double 'constituency1. The Director of Native Labour
and his colleagues presented themselves; as the protectors of black
workers in the dangerous? hostile environment of the industrial
areas. At the same time, the NAD was constantly under pre?ssiure? from
a government elected entirely by whites to produce an obedient and
inexpensive class; of black labourers. This forced the department to
be intensely Jealous of its authoritative image? in the eye?s; of the
African population. In the course of the strike, it became more
important for the NAD to avoid loss of face before the black-
proletariat than to put the mills back to work.(37)
The? other departments which dealt with the strike were the South
African Police (SAP) and the Justice Department. Representing
between them the overtly coercive arm of the State, there? is little
evidence that eithe?r developed as coherent a view of events as did
Labour and Native Affairs. In the? early stages, the Police were in
fact the best informed branch of the State, as they sent spie?s to
union meetings, and compiled factual reports which were sent round
without comment to the other departments.(38) At the height of the
strike, it was, of course?, the? Police who had to do the dirty work
of arresting picketers, though they appear to have done so only
after receiving the go-ahead from Labour and NAD officials. In
general, the SAP and the Justice Department could afford to be less
concerned about the course and final outcome of the dispute, as
they would not be the first to be held responsible by the
Government and the white public if things went wrong.
The stoppage of work on II September 1944 came as a shock to
Page 3
Department of Labour officials. Two years earlier, the Department
of Labour had successfully arranged a Conciliation Board for the
milling industry, comprising the employers and the National Milling
Workers; Industrial Union, the officially recognised organisation
for skilled and some semi-skilled workers. The NMWIU at that point
had been in a deplorable state, with inexpert, part-time leaders,
and the bulk its paultry membership in Arrears with their union
dues. (39) The Department of Labour overcame? these difficulties to
establish what it regarded as an acceptable arena in which to work
out an agreemen t.
The Conciliation Board met in April 1942. The NMWIU had a mandate
from the Transvaal African Milling Workers Union to represent its
members, as pass-bearing Africans were prevented under the
Industrial Conciliation Act from putting their own case. (40) This;
placed the NMWIU in a highly ambiguous position, as one of its
contentions was; that the industry was; unfairly using cheap black
and coloured labour to the detriment of white workers;. The union
further showed its inability to represient all parties equally by
calling for higher wages for coloureds and As;iatics in Durban, on
the s;purious; grounds that they were more efficient than blacks;. (41)
On the positive side, the NMWIU argued for a 207. increase for
unskilled labourers, and a 107. raise for skilled workers.
Predictably, though, the final settlement was much more favourable
to those directly represented at the meeting than to Africans.
£>killed labour won their 10%, with a subsequent 2.5% increasie tiE?d
to each 25 point rise in the retail price index.(42) Labourers'
wages were brought into line with those in Wage Determination 70,
which covered the commercial and distributive industries, but this
applied only in the larger milling centres. Hours of work, overtime
payments and holidays; mere brought under the Factories Act for all
workers.
The impatience shown in 1944 by African labourers in the Transvaal
can in part be traced to the lack of satisfaction accorded them in
this settlement. When it was first enforced, it was the African
Flour Milling Workers;' Union in Natal which protesited most loudly,
and in a manner that was; to have? important repercussions two years
later. (4Z4) The Nataxl union insisted that the agreement should never
have? been extended to Africans at all. It claimed that the white?
union had no right to speak for Africans; and warned that its
members in Durban were threatening to strike against the
'scandalously' low wage of 23s per week. The Labour Department
replied simply that the settlement (which was binding on blacks; to
prevent employers from taking on Africans; to replace whites;) could
not be cancelled under the Industrial Conciliation Act.(44)
This agreement expired on May 24, 1944. Lulled into a false* sense
of security by the fact that the previous agreement had run its
coursie without incident, Department of Labour officials confidently
10
Page 4
expected to be able to arrange a. new settlement between the NMWIU
and the employers. Negotiations began on 3 July 1944, when the
Divisional Inspector submitted the NMWIU's request for a
Conciliation Board; they were still going on when African employees
in the Transvaal struck work on September 11.(45)
Divisions within each of the parties- the State, the unions and the
employers- all hindered the preparation of a new agreement. The
white union was; at first unwilling to represent unskilled workers
at all. Its leaders claimed that the African union had refused to
be bound by any of the findings of a Conciliation Board, and that
the Africans were pursuing their own redress through arbitration.
It is passible that the NMWIU was confusing the position of the
Natal union mentioned above with those of the Transvaal unions.(46)
The NMWIU does not seem to have appreciated the differences of
opinion between the Transvaal African Milling Workers Union (based
in Johannesburgj and operating mainly on the Rand), the African
Milling Workers Union (which had its headquarters in Pretoria), and
the African Flour Milling Workers Union in Natal. When the
Department of Labour later informed the NMWIU that it would have to
represent unskilled interests on the Conciliation Board, its
Secretary, F. Bumby, replied that he had been in close touch with
TAMWU from the outset; but he certainly did not understand the
sense of urgency and despair which drove black workers to take
matters into their own hands.(47)
The NMWIU was further hampered by the lack of organisation which
prevailed in the union throughout the early 1940s. The white union
could not provide the necessary evidence of its membership, and had
to call in the Department of Labour's Inspectors to have its books
cert ified. (48) It was not until early August that the Secretary for
Labour was satisfied that the NMWIU was sufficiently representative
of skilled workers to take its place? on a Conciliation Board. (49)
The employers, too, helped to delay the final settlement. The
Department of Labour's favourite scenario was that the unions
should meet the employers informally and settle their differences
amongst themselves. (50) However., as in 3.942, the? milling industry
took every opportunity to offset any increase in wages.(51) The
trump card for the industry was that the Conciliation Board's; lack
of representativeness prevented its findings being made
retrospective?, so any postonement of the final accord neant a real
saving on wages for employers. The SA Maize Millers' and the
Transvaal Flour Millers' Associations were careful to reject
initial overtures from the NMWIU. Thereafter they deflected the
African unions with vague promises of incorporation under the
Conciliation Board.(52) The employers also kept the Department of
Labour well informed about TAMWU's warnings about industrial
action, with a view to securing the State?'s support in the event of
an illegal stoppage.
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It is unclear whether the milling companies deliberately avoided
forming a single, united body in order to make the application of
national wage agreements more difficult. The NMWIU openly accused
the? Cape Province employers of using this ploy at the time of the
previous Conciliation Board.(53) At any rate? the fact that in
1944, only Port Elizabeth had an umbrella body, with another fifty-
three companies being represented individually, did not make things
any easier.
One? ve?ry re?al division within the ranks; of the employers was over
the issue? of compounds and rations. The Pretoria companies, which
provided both, demanded increases in the deductions they were
allowed to make from their workers1 pay for food and quarters.(54)
They argued that their employees were sheltered from the rise in
the cost of living, and that the value of these services had gone
up. The Pretoria mills paid L4.6.8 plus food and quarters worth
LI.16.0; Johannesburg mills paid only L6. No answer was received
from the Department of Labour, and the arbitrator later followed
TAMWU in condemning the compounds as serving no useful purpose. (55)
To turn once again to the departments of state?, one might expect to
find evidence of greate?r unity and strength of purpose, but this
was far from the case. If anything, the Estate's actions were? less
certain and more contradictory than those? of either the employers
or the unions. The Department of Labour was aware of the intensity
of feeling among black milling workers, but took no action beyond
informing the African unions that preparations for a Conciliation
Board were underway, and warning them not to strike.(56) Labour
Department officials were at first uncertain whether to accede to
calls from supporters of the black workers for an arbitrator under
War Meaure 9 or 143;(37) they only decided on a Conciliation Board
to cover all workers after a lengthy internal debate. (38) Despite?
frequent reminders of the urgency of the situation from, among
others, the Council for Non-Exiropean Trade Unions, the Trades and
Labour Council, and Eienator Hyman Basne?r, the Department of Labour
completely lost sight of the prospect of a strike. Instead, its
officials busied themselves with the intricate procedures involved
in administering a Board under the Industrial Conciliation Act.
The NAD's Director of Native Labour, CP Alport, paid rather more
attention to the Police reports on black traide union meetings, and
took the threat of a stoppage? much more? seriously. Throughout the
ensuing weeks, his department was concerned not to repeat the
mistakes of the coal distributors' strike?. The? main problem with
the DNL's handling of the run up to the milling workers' strike was
that he? confused two entirely separate industries. Alport wis;ely
forewarned the Secretary for Native Affairs; in early July of the
immimence of action by black workers; but it was; not until after
the stoppage in the baking industry, in which 800 Africans were
arrested and then released, that Alport learnt that baking and
milling were two different trades.(59)
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The Transvaal African Milling Workers Union5 led by G. Molefe,
first served its demands on milling companies across the Reef on
June 14.(60) The union was not unreasonable: its Secretary asked
for a minimum wage of L.2 p&r week plus cost of living allowance.
When the employers rejectd these demands) and the Department of
Labour failed to bring about a speedy settlement, TAMWU found it
increasingly difficult to keep control of its members. On 23 July,
workers at a mass meeting in Johannesburg ignored their leaders'
calls for patience, and voted to strike from 31 July if their
demands were not met. The strike was only prevented at the last
minute when the Department of Labour announced that a Conciliation
Board would meet on 14 August.) and that TAMWU could give evidence
before it.(61)
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iv) The milling workers' strike.
The Conciliation Board for the milling industry met from 14-16
August, 1944. Molefe and Gana Makabeni of CNETU appeared on TAMWU's
behalf with a range of proposals on rates of pay and
conditions. (62) These had clearly bee?n drawn up in association with
the NMWIU, which made similar demands during the Board's meetings.
The NMWIU secured concessions on annual leave, and on the
reclassification at higher rates of pay of maize and provender
millers, and of skilled workers in Natal. The white union accepted
the employers' offer of LI.15.0 for unskilled workers in the main
urban centres! with lesser rates in other areas. Negotiations broke
down on the issue of skilled wages and the class;! fi cat ion and rates
of pay of semi-skilled employees.(63)
If the Minister of Labour had then heeded TAMWU's request for an
arbitrator under War Measure 145, the strike could still have been
prevented. African labourers would have accepted the rates; already
agreed upon by the Board* and the whole dispute might have been
wrapped up in a day. Instead, the Department of Labour, true to its
practice of operating wherever posisible through the white unions,
pressed ahead with its drawn out debate with the NMWIU.
Further procedural problems dogged the road to a final settlement
between the employers; and the NMWIU. First, they could not agree on
an arbitrator, so this had to be left up to the Minister of Labour
to decide. The following week, the Secretary of the NMWIU realised
that his organisation could not afford the services of an
independent arbitrator. What he really wanted was a settlement
under War Measure 9, which would force the Government to foot the
bill.(64) The Department of Labour overcame this by selecting a
civil servant for the Job. Again, delays occurred, as; an internal
disagreement arose over whether to appoint an official from Cape
Town, or one from the Rand. By the time the? department had picked
the Additional Magistrate? in Johannesburg as arbitrator, and
outlined his duties, the strike was already underway.(65)
"The E>tar" estimated that 1200 Africans withheld their labour on
Monday, 11 September; the next day, the "Rand Daily Mail" put the
figure at 1500.(66) Production was; halted at mills all across the
Reef, even though white employees, content that the arbitrator was;
appointed on the very day the stoppage began, refused to come out
in solidarity.
The? NAD's; role automatically became much more important once the
strike? began. The stoppage caused a flurry of activity within the
department, not only because of the numbers involved and the
crucial position of the milling indusstry, but als;o because it drew
the attention of the very highes;t politicians. Piet van der Byl,
the? Ministe?r of Ncitis'e Affairs, reported to General Smuts, who made
personal recommendations through the Department of Labour
concerning the return to work.(67) With bread running out in the
14-
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country'si industrial heartland, and with their political masters
watching anxiously over their shoulders, it was essential for the
NAD to resolve the dispute swiftly and efficiently.
The first step in the NAD's; strategy was for the DNL to address a
large gathering of strikers at the Premier Milling Company in
Johannesburg.<63) He informed them that an arbitrator had been
appointed, and asked them to return to work in the meantime. To
back this up, Daniel Koza was released from police custody and the
charges against him dropped on condition that he would use his
influence to end the stoppage. The first meeting met with no
response, so three days later A1 port tried again, this time
appearing at one of the daily gatherings of strikers at the
Johannesburg Bantu Sports Ground.
As in the coal distributors1 strike, the DNL had to maintain a fine
line between preserving the dignity and authority of his office,
and impressing upon his audience the supposed advantages of going
back to work. He? kept up the debate for two hours; but with little
to offer but threats of replacement and arrest, and vague promises
of a future settlement, he made no progress;. The NAD was generally
unpopular among the African population in the cities. This was
especially s;o among members of African trade unions;, asi the NAD was;
seen as; coming between them and full recognition and registration
by the Department of Labour. Consequently* Alport's; claim that he
was "anxious, as their guardian, that no new labour should be
recruited in their place" had no impact on the meeting.(69)
Similar efforts; by other Native Labour Bureau officials and by the
Native Commissioner in Krugersdorp also failed. (7(3) An official
from the Department of Labour visited the Exports; Ground to menace
the strikers with the legal position, but to no avail.(71) The
failure of these efforts and the disrespect with which their
representatives were treated) confirmed the views of both
departments that the Government must take a tougher line.
When these meetings; took place, the NAD's; pass offices were already
supplying replacements to the mills. By 18 September, four mills
were working normally, with further recruiting going ahead at the
employers' request. The NAD saw this as an integral part of its
overall strategy; it wanted the mills to keep the replacements as;
permanent s;taff, and not to use them merely to force? the hand of
the strikers (though the departme?nt tried this too). NAD officials
thus refused to learn the lesson of the coal dis;tributors;' s;trike>,
where the replacements were dismissed as soon as it suited the
merchants.(72)
After their initial overtures; to the s;trikers;, the Native Affairs
and Labour Departments wholeheartedly supported more repressive
tactics. In accordance with the DNL's minute; at the close of the
coal dispute, the Department of Labour announced that the sitrike-
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bound sreas would be excluded from the benefits of the arbitrator's
award. NAD and Labour Department officials mere replaced at the
strikers' meetings by a heavy police presence, and armed constables
were sent to protect transport vans. The SAP read a Control Order
at the Bantu Sports Ground, but this merely provoked the CNETU
leaders to give? the order to begin picketing the mills. (73) On 12
EJeptember, there were violent clashes between police and picketers
when the latter attacked substitue labourers. Three days later, the
£)AP took the initiative by attempting to arrest strikers at several
mills for holding unauthorised gatherings. At the Union Flour
Mills, the picketers came armed with sticks, and used stones and
bricks to fend off the police. In all, some 646 Africans were
arrested for public violence and illegal gathering. Two CNETU
leaders, Edward Mkoena and Elliot Molapo, were held under the
Riotous Assemblies Act.(74)
At the political level, the strike was not going well for the
Government and the bureaucracy. The; "Sunday Times" quoted a Joint
statement by the Campaign for Right and Justice, the Trades and
Labour Council and CNETU, which blamed the dispute on the
starvation wages paid to urban Africans. The Department of Labour
was singled out for failing to appoint an arbitrator under War
Measure 145 in either this or the coal strikes. In the Afrikaans
press, "Die Vaderland" praised the Prime Minister's swift and
forceful action;(75) but "Die Transvaler" attacked the Smuts,
arguing that the? strike was "a symptom of the bad conditions the
Government had created in South Africa with its colour policy and
policy in connection with Communism".(76) From the left, the
Department of Labour was besieged by protests from TLC and CNETU,
and the Ministers of Justice and Native? Affairs spent three hours
listening to a deputation from the CRJ and several religious
denominations. All this moved the DNL to plead that he, at le?ast,
had seen the strike; coming as e?arly as IE* July, and had called for
prompt action to forestall it.(77)
Up to this point, Native Affairs and Labour had enjoyed the
wholehearted support of the employers for their handling of the
dispute. However, on IE) September, the mill-owners broke ranks and
negotiated with the CRJ. With half the strikers in gaol and no
prospect of an early settlement, the employers considered that
their immediate interests were best served by an unofficial
compromise. The substitute labour had proved to be of little use,
and the mills were anxious to re-employ experienced workers.
Senator Basner agreed on behalf of the strikers that they would
return to work in exchange for a promise that the employers would
put pressure on the Ministers of Justice and Labour to drop the
charges. The mill-owners further bound themselves to take back 70"/.
of the workers immediately, and to negotiate with TAMWU for a wage
increase.(78)
This "gentlemen's agreement" highlighted the conflict of interest
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which existed between the mi 11-owners and the Departments of Labour
and Native? Affairs. The mill-owners were concerned with the
immediate? profitability of their businesses, which, they claimed,
had been hindered, first by the Labour Department's footdragging in
appointing an arbitrator, and then by the? mass arrests which made
an early return to work impossible.(79)
Department of Labour officials protested furiously that their
administrative procedures had been undermined by the unofficial
settlement.(B0) Madeley had announced that the strike-bound areas
would not be covered by the arbitrator; under no circumstances did
they want the strikers to benefit from wage increases before
milling workers in the rest of the country.(81) As far as the
Department of Labour was concerned, once its machinery was set in
motion, there was no way of altering its course or pace.
The NAD was more concerned about how the whole affair affected it
standing with Africans. Its prestige had already taken a blow when
Alport was rebuffed by the strikers' meeting in Johannesburg. This
was not helped by the NAD's involvement in recruiting substitute
labourers. The Minister and hist senior civil servants; believed that
they had been betrayed by the employers, and that their authority
in similar situations in future would be diminished. At a Joint
meeting with the Department of Labour and several mill-owners,
Reitz harangued the employers for failing to "stand by their guns":
Having drawn the Prime Minister and three Ministers into this you
see some obscure outside body to settle the matter without even
notifying us of what you were doing and subvert and jeopardise all
future negotiations.(82)
The Government and its Department of Native Affairs; had to consider
the long term interests of industry as a whole, not just the short
term requirements of a few mi 11 --owners. The? EState had established
machinery to control African workers;- to prevent them striking, and
to obviate the need for high wage incre?as;es; which, as Smuts himself
said, would only lead to spiralling inflation. (83) In this cas;e?,
the employers had first invoked the State machinery, and then
abandoned it when they found it too cumbersome and slow-moving.
Underlying the outrage expressed by the two departments and their
ministers was the fear that they were their grip on the entire
field of labour relations was starting to slip: in other words,
they were in danger of losing part of their 'raison d'etre'.
The solution agreed on to strengthen the two departments' position
was for the mill-owners to refuse wage increases to the former
strikers until the arbitrator had announced his; award. Reitz would
ask the Department of Justice not to withdraw the charges on any
account. Finally, the DNL would "drive home to the Natives in
17
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question that the strike had not achieved any object other than the
loss of wages for the period of the stoppage of work".(84)
18
v) Conclusion
A few weeks later, the Department of Labour refused to send the
instructions which they had promised the employers on what to do
about the strikers' wage increase. The department's officials were
still smarting from what they saw as shabby treatment by both sides
in the dispute. It was left up to the industry to grant the
increase? awarded by the arbitrator to the rest of the country: a
rise of 4s.l0d on the Rand, and 2s.4d in Pretoria.(85) Higher rates
were also laid down for some semi-skilled workers. By this time,
the Attorney-General had already dropped charges against the
strikers: there was little point in his filling the Jails and
further disrupting the milling industry Just to save face for
another branch of the civil service.(86)
The entire history of the strike demonstrates the importance of
looking at such divisions within the bureaucracy) and how they
affected the course of events in society as a whole. This type Df
analysis is specially pertinent to the history of labour relations,
as the Industrial Conciliation and Wage Acts drew trade unions into
the structure of administrative procedure) and) in many cases,
dictated the terms and pace of their development.
Dunbar Moodie) writing on the mineworkers' strike of 1946, has
shown how different departments, performing disparate functions,
could approach a problem from ai variety of angles; but the thrust
of his article is that the State pulled together to tackle the
stoppage in the gold-mining industry, and to buttress the interests
of big capitaxl. (£)7) An examination of other disputes, such as the
coal distributors' and milling workers' strikes of 1944, highlights
a number of other factors which have to be taken into account. Most
importantly, it is necessary to consider the internal interests
which developed within particular departments, and which, on
occasion, put them at odds with each other, with the employers;, and
with the unions. This affected not Just the civil servants, but
their ministers too, whose political fortunes were tied to the
prestige and efficiency of their departments.
At the same time, the dynamics; of such events; were often contingent
on the administrative procedures followed by civil service
departments and their sub-branches. In the case of the milling
dispute) the Department of Labour's primary concern with white
unions and on following through on time-consuming regulations;, left
African workers feeling so desperate and isolated that they
resorted to strike action. The DNL was; at least aware of the way
things were going, but it was not his Job to interfere in
Department of Labour business; he contented himself with reporting
to his own superior in Cape Town.
It would be wrong to conclude from this that the state bureaucracy
was; s;o hopele-?ssly divided that the? policies; and procedures; of the
different departments were at odds; with those? of the Prime Minister
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and his Cabinet. Smuts himself approved many of the steps taken by
the bureaucrats in the course of this strike. On the whole, the
EJtate combined fairly effectively to keep workers; in check, and to
keep the wheels of industry grinding for the benefit of the moneyed
classes. But to ignore the bureaucracy, and the administrative
procedures and sectional interests which flourished within it, is
to prohibit a full understanding of the labour history of South
Africa in this period.
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